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"The best catechists, those who filled our churches on Sundays, were the first to go with 
machetes in their hands," said a Roman Catholic bishop from Rwanda. The observers take the 
comment to speak for most Rwandan churches in those fateful months of 1994 during which a 
million people were killed. "There is absolutely no doubt that significant numbers of prominent 
Christians were involved in the killings, sometimes slaughtering their own church leaders," 
writes Ian Linden (Linden, 1997, 50). What is particularly disturbing about the complicity of the 
church is that, as John Martin points out, "Rwanda is without doubt one of Africa's most 
evangelized nations. Eight out of ten of its people claim to be Christians. Moreover, thanks to the 
East African Revival in the 1930s and a spontaneous movement of the Holy Spirit in the majority 
Roman Catholic churches in the 1970s, Rwanda has been held up as one of the jewels in the 
crown of charismatic Christianity" (Martin, 1995, 1).  
By singling out Rwanda's churches, I do not mean either to deny that many Rwandan Christians 
courageously opposed the killings or to suggest that the complicity of Rwandan churches is an 
exception to an otherwise impeccable record of churches' functioning as agents of peace. Rather, 
Rwanda's genocide demonstrates with particular force the church's disturbing propensity to be an 
accomplice in social strife. It was not a complicity of a church whose Christian commitments 
functioned merely as a cultural resource, easily misused by politicians in a way that runs at 
cross-purposes to the deep grammar of these commitments, as in the case of Orthodoxy in former 
Yugoslavia. To the contrary, the Christian commitments of the Rwandan churches, like those of 
the Irish evangelicals, seemed strong and genuine; they were presumably a force that had shaped 
the lives of the believers. The issue is not simply, How could churches have been accomplices in 
the most heinous crimes? Much more disturbing, the issue is, How could the members of 
churches which had emerged from what was described as a fresh outpouring of the Holy Spirit--
the Spirit of communion and the Spirit of life--how could they either participate in the genocide 
or turn their eyes the other way during that genocide?  
I want to explore here some reasons for this kind of church complicity in social strife and 
propose an alternative way of approaching Christian social responsibility that would help 
churches function as agents of peace. Of course, many churches in diverse context have not been 
complicit, but faithful. To them I want to offer theological resources to better equip them for the 
arduous and treacherous task of peacemaking. 
Churches and Conflict
Why are churches, the presumed agents of peace, at best impotent in the face of their people's 
conflicts and at worst perpetrators of the most heinous crimes? Some scholars, like Maurice 
Bloch in Prey into Hunter, argue that Christian faith fosters violence because Christian faith is a 
religion, and religions are by their very nature violent. The "irreducible core of the ritual process" 
involves "a marked element of violence or ... of conquest ... of the here and now by the 
transcendental" (Bloch, 1992, 4-5). In everyday life, ritual violence mutates into social violence, 
argues Bloch. Other scholars, like (by implication) Regina Schwartz in The Curse of Cain, try to 
explain the Christian faith's complicity in violence by pointing not to the general features of the 
phenomenon of religion, but to the specific character of the Christian faith. Along with Judaism 
and Islam, Christian faith is a monotheist religion and therefore an exclusive religion that divides 
people into "us" and "them"; such monotheistic exclusivism is bound to have a violent legacy 
(Schwartz, 1997). "We" have on our side the one true God who is against "them," infidels and 
renegades. This is no place to enter a debate with critics over the violent character of religions in 
general or monotheist religions in particular. I just note that I remain unpersuaded. These 
proposals to explain complicity are unable to account for that fact that the churches are often 
approached to mediate in situations of conflict, and even less for the fact that they are sometimes 
successful in their efforts.  
In my estimation, rather than the character of the Christian faith itself, a better explanation of 
why Christian churches are either impotent in the face of violent conflicts or actively participate 
in them derives from the proclivities of its adherents which are at odds with the character of the 
Christian faith. One way to describe these pernicious proclivities is to speak of confusion of 
loyalty. Though explicitly giving ultimate allegiance to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, many 
Christians in fact seem to have an overriding commitment to their respective cultures and ethnic 
groups. Hence in conflict situations they tend to fight on the side of their cultural group and 
employ faith as a weapon in struggle. The empirical research on the churches' reaction to ethnic 
conflicts conducted by Ralph Premdas in a number of countries in the southern hemisphere has 
shown that the "inter-communal antipathies present in the society at large are reflected in the 
attitudes of churches and their adherents" (Premdas, 1994, 55). Though the clergy are often 
invited to adjudicate, "the reconciling thrust quickly evaporates after the initial effort" (55f.). The 
most important reason for failure, he notes, is the "inter-locking relations of church and cultural 
section which spill into partisan politics marked by the mobilization of collective hate and 
cultivated bigotry" (56). Along with their parishioners the clergy are often "trapped within the 
claims of their own ethnic or cultural community" and thus serve as "legitimators of ethnic 
conflict" (56), despite their genuine desire to take seriously the Gospel call to the ministry of 
reconciliation. 
Churches find themselves unable to act on the Gospel call to the ministry of reconciliation 
because their commitments are wrongly ordered--universal claims of the Gospel of Jesus Christ 
are subordinated to the claims of the particular social groups they inhabit instead of the claims of 
particular social groups being subordinated to the universal claims of the Gospel. But why this 
confusion of loyalties? Of the many reasons that can be given, I want to explore in this paper one 
that I consider particularly significant: it consists of misconceptions about the "ministry of 
reconciliation." Ralph Premdas concludes his compelling article with the following 
recommendation: 
The leaders of the churches will have to take the issue of ethnic conflict more seriously. Of 
utmost importance is a better understanding of the social, political and theological factors 
involved. The churches will have to appoint committees that investigate the historical origin of 
the conflict, examine the social scientific literature on ethnic conflicts, study the theory and 
practice of conflict resolution, and devise instruments of popular education that raise people's 
awareness of the issues at stake and communicate the biblical message of reconciliation. 
(Premdas, 1994, 56) 
Premdas, a sociologist, rightly calls churches to take seriously the Gospel call to the ministry of 
reconciliation by studying the nature of conflicts and the possibilities for their resolution, and 
then by educating people about how to engage in peace-making. He simply assumes that 
everything is in order with the message of reconciliation itself; that message only needs to be 
communicated. He is too charitable with the theology of the churches, however. As a theologian, 
I want to suggest that merely communicating the message of reconciliation will not do. A prior 




Theology of the Social Meaning of Reconciliation
Since reconciliation is a central theological category, one would think that explications of its 
social meaning would abound. This is, however, not the case. We face not so much mistaken 
explications of the social meaning of reconciliation as a deeply disturbing absence of sustained 
attempts to relate the core theological beliefs about reconciliation to the shape of the church's 
social responsibility. In "A Theological Afterword" to the book The Reconciliation of Peoples 
(1997), one of its editors, Gregory Baum, writes,  
The authors [of the essays in the book] realize that the church's theological tradition offers very 
little wisdom on the social meaning of reconciliation. It is symptomatic that even in the most 
recent Handbook of Catholic Theology, published by Crossroad in 1995, the long, scholarly 
article on reconciliation makes no reference whatever to the reconciliation between peoples. The 
New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought, published by Liturgical Press in 1994, contains no 
article on reconciliation. Reflection on this topic is only beginning in the church. (Baum, 1997, 
187)  
A Catholic theologian, Baum points to a deficiency in Catholic reference works. The problem is 
equally acute in Protestant reference works. The more or less "liberal" Dictionary of Ethics, 
Theology and Society (Routledge in 1996) has no listing under "reconciliation." With the notable 
exception of the New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology (InterVarsity Press, 
1995), articles on "reconciliation" found in evangelical theological and ethical dictionaries 
concentrate on reconciliation between human beings and God. The entry in Baker's Dictionary of 
Christian Ethics (ed. by Carl F. Henry)--written by a New Testament scholar!--is symptomatic. 
Toward the end the author notes that "in recent time some have thought that reconciliation ought 
to be seen in what we may term a horizontal rather than a vertical direction.... Reconciliation 
then becomes a way of enabling men to live together in meaningful community." Tellingly, the 
author adds a concession that "there is, of course, some truth in this." But then the text goes on to 
emphasize the significance of the right order between reconciliation with God and reconciliation 
between human beings: first vertical and then, as a consequence, horizontal. The author made the 
comment on the social dimension of reconciliation as a side remark, to indicate the path not to be 
taken rather than the path to be explored. 
There are two basic ways in which the social agenda of the church has been isolated from the 
message of reconciliation. The first way reduces the doctrine of reconciliation to the 
reconciliation of the soul with God and is favored by pietistic or socially conservative 
evangelicals. This approach rests on the correct core belief that all persons are sinners before 
God and are called to repent and receive forgiveness and new life in Christ. The fateful move 
comes when this core belief is combined with an almost exclusive emphasis on private morality 
conceived of as the ethical consequence of the reconciliation of a person with God and with a 
thoroughly a-political stance based on the persuasion that the church and the state have distinct 
spheres of authority. Reconciliation then has a theological and personal meaning, but no wider 
social meaning. "Souls" get reconciled with God and persons get reconciled with one another, 
but the wider social world ridden by strife is left more or less to its own devices. The obvious 
problem with such a retreat from public responsibility is that it ill befits the sons and daughters 
of the Old Testament prophets and the followers of Jesus Christ.  
The second way in which social issues have been isolated from the message of reconciliation has 
been tacitly to concede the truncated understanding of reconciliation that I have just sketched, to 
critique social withdrawal, and then to place at the center of the Christian social agenda the 
pursuit of freedom and the struggle for justice. This approach is favored by more "liberal" groups 
who wish to remain, in Nietzsche's phraseology but not with Nietzsche's meaning, "faithful to 
this earth." They have effectively left the message of reconciliation to the "otherworldly" pietists 
and evangelicals, and taken up the pursuit of liberation as the only appropriate response to social 
problems. Reconciliation between people, they believe, can take place only after liberation is 
accomplished; peace will emerge only after justice is done.  
The pursuit of liberation as a prior task to reconciliation is beset with two major problems. First, 
though it rightly takes social responsibility seriously, it divorces the character of social 
engagement from the very center of the Christian faith--from the narrative of the cross of Christ 
which reveals the very character of the Triune God. Second, it is suited only to situations of 
manifest evil in which one side is only the victim and the other only the perpetrator. Most social 
conflicts are, however, not so clean. Especially after conflicts have been going on for some time, 
each party sees itself as the victim and perceives its rival as the perpetrator, and has good reasons 
for reading the situation in this way. As a consequence, each can see itself as engaged in the 
struggle for liberation and the pursuit of justice, and thus the Christian faith ends up providing 
primarily legitimation for the struggle. Reconciliation is not even attempted--at least not until 
"our" side has won.  
These two ways of shying away from explicating the social meaning of reconciliation -- two 
ways that mutually reinforce each other -- have left churches with no resources in situations of 
conflict. They find it difficult to help foster reconciliation, even to resist being pulled into the 
vortex of conflict; indeed, often they are nothing more than vengeful combatants on the one side 
with no other thought in their minds but the destruction of their enemies. This dire deficiency of 
both theology and practice underscores the need to explore in a sustained way the social meaning 
of reconciliation. As we do so, my proposal is to move away from "justice" as the central and 
overarching category around which Christian social engagement is organized and to replace it 
with what I have called elsewhere "embrace" and what can less poetically be called "love." The 
suggestion is not, of course, to give up the struggle for justice or to substitute peace for justice. 
Rather, the suggestion is to understand the struggle for justice as a dimension of the pursuit of 
reconciliation whose ultimate goal is a community of love.  
In my book Exclusion and Embrace I have attempted to retrieve "embrace" as the central 
category for Christian social engagement and argue for justice as an essential dimension of 
embrace (Volf, 1996). Elsewhere I have developed Trinitarian underpinnings for the main 
argument of the book (Volf, 1998). Here I want to explore briefly some biblical bases for 
"embrace" rather than justice and for reconciliation rather than liberation as the central categories 




One way to argue for the primacy of reconciliation in the New Testament would be to look at the 
Gospel accounts of the life of Jesus. This would lead us to highlight grace and forgiveness, 
which are so prominent in Jesus' encounters with "the sinners" (Williams, 1997) - grace and 
forgiveness, I hasten to add, that do not stand in opposition to justice and blame, but affirm 
justice and blame in the act of transcending them. Another way to argue for the primacy of 
reconciliation would be to examine the ethical appropriation of the basic story of Christ -- his 
life, death and resurrection -- in the New Testament writings. This would lead us to highlight the 
narrative of the death of Christ -- the innocent victim -- as the paradigm for the Christian life of 
self-donation (Johnson, 1996). A third way to argue biblically for the primacy of reconciliation 
would be to concentrate directly on the theology of reconciliation developed by the Apostle Paul. 
This is what I propose to do here. I will narrow my focus to a key Pauline text on reconciliation, 
2 Corinthians 5:17-21, and explore its overlooked social dimension(11) in relation to the origin of 
Paul's distinctive use of the term reconciliation. 
Paul writes, 
So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new! 
All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ, and has given us the ministry of reconciliation; 
that is, in Christ God was reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and entrusting 
the message of reconciliation to us. So we are ambassadors for Christ, since God is making his appeal through us; 
we entreat you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God. For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so 
that in him we might become the righteousness of God (NRSV). 
The most notable feature of the passage is the distinctive way in which Paul uses the term "reconciliation," a use 
which stands in sharp contrast to the prevalent contemporary notions of reconciliation between God and human 
beings. Explicating the distinctive character of Paul's use, Seyoon Kim writes,  
Paul never says that God is reconciled (or, that God reconciles himself) to human beings, but always that God 
reconciles human beings to himself or that human beings are reconciled to God. It is not, in fact, God who must be 
reconciled to human beings, but human beings who need to be reconciled to God. Nor is it by people's repentance, 
prayers or other good works that reconciliation between God and human beings is accomplished, but rather by God's 
grace alone. (Kim, 1997, 103) 
What Kim notes here about God--the offended party--offering reconciliation to humanity--the offender--is now the 
standard explication of the passage. What is new in Kim's argument is his account of how Paul came to this unique 
understanding of reconciliation. He argues persuasively that the origin of Paul's distinct use of the term 
reconciliation lies in Paul's encounter with the risen Christ on the road to Damascus where he was headed to 
persecute the early followers of Jesus Christ. Kim concludes,  
It is most likely that his [Paul's] use of the metaphor of reconciliation grew out of his own theological reflections on 
his Damascus road conversion experience. This thesis explains, more plausibly than any other, the fundamental 
innovation that Paul made in the ... idea of reconciliation--that is, that it is not human beings who reconcile an angry 
God to themselves ... rather, it is God who reconciles human beings to himself through the atoning death of Jesus 
Christ. For on the Damascus road, Paul, who came to see himself as God's enemy in his activities before Damascus, 
experienced God's reconciling action, which brought forgiveness of sins and the making of a new creation by his 
grace. (122)  
If Kim is right, two significant features of a theology of reconciliation emerge with clarity, features of great import 
for the proper understanding of its social meaning. First, though grace is unthinkable without justice, justice is 
subordinate to grace. As a persecutor of the church, Paul was an enemy of God (or, more precisely, he came to see 
himself in retrospect as an enemy of God). In conversion, Paul encountered God who was not wrathful, as God 
should have been, but who instead showed love by offering to reconcile Paul, the enemy, to himself. Paul's 
conversion was not the result of the pursuit of strict justice on the part of the "victim." Had the "victim" pursued 
strict justice, Paul never would have become the apostle of the very church he was persecuting.  
Inscribed in the narrative of the very event that transformed him from persecutor to apostle was the message which 
Paul came to proclaim--the message that God "justifies the ungodly" (Romans 4:5), that we were reconciled to God 
"while we were enemies" (Romans 5:10). At the core of the doctrine of reconciliation lies the belief that the offer of 
reconciliation is not based on justice done and the cause of enmity removed. Rather, the offer of reconciliation is a 
way of justifying the unjust and overcoming the opponents' enmity--not so as to condone their injustice and affirm 
their enmity, but to open up the possibility of doing justice and living in peace whose ultimate shape is a community 
of love.  
Though Paul was saved through the gift of divine grace by which God sought to reconcile the enemy, no cheap 
reconciliation-- which closes its eyes before injustice-- took place on the road to Damascus. The divine voice named 
the action by its proper name -- "persecution" -- and asked the uncomfortable "why?" "Saul, Saul, why do you 
persecute me?" (Acts 9:4). Jesus Christ himself named the injustice and made the accusation in the very act of 
offering forgiveness and reconciliation. But though divine justice was an indispensable element of reconciliation, 
reconciliation was not simply the consequence of divine justice carried out. 
Second, though reconciliation of human beings to God has priority, reconciliation between human beings is 
intrinsic to their reconciliation to God. If the origin of Paul's message of reconciliation was his encounter with the 
risen Christ on the road to Damascus, then the enmity toward God--the human trespasses which God does not hold 
against us on account of the atoning death of Christ -- does not consist in isolated attitudes and acts toward God 
which then, as a consequence, result in enmity toward other human beings. In the account in Acts we read that "Saul 
was ravaging the church by entering house after house; dragging off both men and women, he committed them to 
prison" (Acts 8:3). On the road to Damascus, he was "still breathing threats and murder against the disciples of the 
Lord" (9:1). At the same time, the voice from heaven identified itself explicitly as the voice of Jesus Christ: "I am 
Jesus, whom you are persecuting" (9:4-5). So from the start and at its heart, the enmity toward God is enmity toward 
human beings, and the enmity toward human beings is enmity toward God. Consequently, from the start, 
reconciliation does not simply have a vertical but also a horizontal dimension. It contains a turn away from the 
enmity toward people, not just from enmity to God, and it contains a movement toward a community, precisely that 
community which was the target of enmity. Just as the persecutor was received by God in Christ, so the persecutor 
was received by the community which he had persecuted. And he in turn sought to give a gift to the community that 
received him: he became a builder of the very community that he sought to destroy (Acts 9:20). 
Consequently, just as grace lies at the core of Paul's message of reconciliation with God, so grace--grace, I repeat, 
whose essential dimension is affirmation of the suspended justice--lies at the core of his mission to reconcile Jews 
and Gentiles (Dunn, 1997; Gundry-Volf, 1997).(12) Moreover, Paul argued that the pattern of the divine reconciling 
movement toward estranged humanity is the model of how the followers of Christ should relate to their enemies, 
whether they are Christians or not (Romans 15:7) (Volf, 1996, 28f.). Hence it is no accident that in the circle around 
Paul a grand vision of reconciliation was conceived: "For in him [Christ] all the fullness of God was pleased to 
dwell, and through him God was pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, by making 
peace through the blood of his cross" (Colossians 1:20). The ultimate vision not only for the church but also for the 
whole of reality is a vision of the reconciliation of all things.  
The Pauline vision of reconciliation--a vision that entails a coherent set of fundamental beliefs about the nature of 
God and of human beings and about the relation between justice and love--lies at the core of the Christian faith. If 
social engagement is to be properly Christian, it must to be governed by this vision. And only if social engagement 
is governed by this vision will churches have adequate theological resources to resist the temptation to become 




Many are the reasons why theologians have hesitated to let the Pauline vision of reconciliation govern Christian 
social thought and practice. One is certainly the dominance of the concepts of "freedom" and "justice" in the 
political discourse of modernity. Another is a tendency in some conservative Christian circles to embrace a vision of 
reconciliation as an alternative to the struggle for justice. In the remainder of this paper I want to address this second 
reason for hesitations about reconciliation. Let me state from the outset: when I argue that "reconciliation" ought to 
replace "liberation" and love replace justice as the central categories for Christian social thought, nothing could be 
further from my mind than the abandonment of the pursuit of justice. To the contrary. In fact, at times the struggle 
for justice must be in the forefront of our attention--though never so prominent as to crowd out the framework of 
"embrace" into which justice must be placed if it is to be properly understood and salutarily pursued. But how 
should we relate reconciliation and liberation positively? 
Consider the critique of "cheap reconciliation" contained in the Kairos Document, written before the dismantling of 
apartheid in South Africa,  
In our situation in South Africa today it would be totally unchristian to plead for reconciliation and peace before the 
present injustices have been removed. Any such plea plays into the hands of the oppressor by trying to persuade 
those of us who are oppressed to accept our oppression and to become reconciled to the intolerable crimes that are 
committed against us. That is not Christian reconciliation, it is sin. It is asking us to become accomplices in our own 
oppression, to become servants of the devil. No reconciliation is possible in South Africa without justice. (Art. 3.1) 
The vision described here as "cheap reconciliation" sets "justice" and "peace" as alternatives. To pursue 
reconciliation here means to give up the struggle for liberation, to put up with oppression. From my perspective, this 
would amount to a betrayal of the oppressed as well as of the Christian faith. As I read the Christian message, a 
prophetic strand which denounces economic and political oppression has a prominent place in it. This prophetic 
strand cannot be removed from it without gravely distorting the message. 
Having rejected with the Kairos Document a cheap grace of cheap reconciliation, I want to argue against the 
tendency of the document--a tendency that it shares with much of Christian social thinking in recent decades--either 
to see reconciliation and liberation as alternatives (from the perspective of the process) or to see reconciliation as 
subsequent to liberation (from the perspective of the outcome). First, taken seriously, such a "first liberation, then 
reconciliation" stance is an impossibility. As Nietzsche rightly noted in Human, All Too Human, given the nature of 
human interaction, all pursuit of justice not only rests on partial injustices but also creates new injustices (Nietzsche, 
1996, 216). Moreover, all accounts of what is just are to some extent relative to a particular group and therefore 
invariably contested by the rival group. No peace is possible within the overarching framework of strict justice for 
the simple reason that no strict justice is possible. Second, "first liberation, then reconciliation" is at odds with the 
core Christian beliefs inscribed in the narrative of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. As I have argued 
earlier, the Pauline version of the Christian faith--and the same could be argued for the practice and teaching of 
Jesus--stands and falls with the idea that grace has priority over justice (grace, again, which does not negate justice 
but which affirms justice in the act of transcending it).  
It is noteworthy that the peaceful dismantling of apartheid in South Africa did not follow the schema "first 
liberation, then reconciliation" advocated by the Kairos Document. As John de Gruchy has noted, at the very time 
the document was being written, tentative secret talks were under way between Mandela and the South African 
government. It had become abundantly clear to Mandela, de Gruchy goes on to say, 
that there was no alternative. Neither the state nor the liberation movement had the capacity to achieve a decisive 
victory, and the prolonging of the vicious stalemate could only spell disaster for the country as a whole. Seeking 
reconciliation was, paradoxically, an instrument of the struggle to end apartheid and establish a just social order. The 
path of reconciliation was not only the goal of liberation but a means to achieve that end. It was an instrument in 
which the revolutionary struggle, political realism, and moral integrity combined to produce an almost irresistible 
force. (de Gruchy, 1997, 18) 
Notice the highlighting of two essential elements in this account of democratic change in South Africa--both 
elements rightly emphasized but, from my perspective, inadequately conceived and related to one another. First, 
struggle for justice was indispensable. In situations of significant difference in power as in the apartheid South 
Africa, the weaker party must often engage in struggle to bring the stronger party to the point of wanting peace with 
justice rather than pacification of the oppressed. Second, reconciliation was not simply the result of a successful 
struggle for justice. Rather, the move toward reconciliation preceded the achievement of justice and was a means 
toward greater justice. The rightful polemic against "cheap reconciliation" was not allowed to "undermine the 
potential of reconciliation as an instrument for achieving justice" (22). Apartheid was dismantled, argues de Gruchy, 
through "a two-pronged attack ... which may be described, in hindsight, in terms of a dialectical understanding of 
reconciliation," (22) reconciliation seen both as a result of justice and as an instrument of justice.  
In de Gruchy's dialectical understanding of reconciliation, struggle for justice is not only rightly seen as 
indispensable, but is also given preeminence; liberation towers over reconciliation. The offer of reconciliation was 
made prior to the realization of justice not because the framework of justice needed to be transcended in principle; 
rather, the move toward reconciliation was inserted into the framework of justice because no party could achieve a 
decisive victory. So from this perspective it was "paradoxical," as de Gruchy puts it, that the pursuit of reconciliation 
functioned as an instrument of the struggle to end apartheid. In his account, the schema "first liberation, then 
reconciliation" remained intact, only the tactic changed because the assessment of the situation changed. De Gruchy 
may be right historically about the process by which apartheid was dismantled. Is it adequate theologically, 
however? Though his "dialectical understanding of reconciliation" represents a significant move in the right 
direction, I suggest that it still inadequately relates liberation and reconciliation, struggle for justice and striving after 
peace. I want to argue that there is nothing paradoxical in the fact that the pursuit of reconciliation brought about 
greater justice. 
If one sets human relations primarily in the larger framework of justice, in any settlement reached one or both 
parties will inescapably be left with a feeling of not having received their proper due. Hence the discourse of 
reconciliation will always remain predominantly the discourse of "principled compromise," understood as 
"willingness to give ground on what is not essential for the sake of the greater good," as de Gruchy in fact states 
(18). The need for "compromise" is understandable, and de Gruchy puts it well (though he seems not to see the full 
implications of his comment): "clearly," he writes, "it would be impossible to make adequate reparations for all the 
injustice and hurt caused by apartheid and the centuries of colonialism that preceded it" (26), which is what justice 
would demand. In addition to the call for compromise, the only thing de Gruchy can demand within his framework 
is that "it is essential that as much is done as possible to overcome the legacy of apartheid and redress historic 
wrongs" (26). The demand is, of course, right; one would not want to demand less justice than what is possible. The 
trouble is that under the overreaching framework of justice, such a demand will necessarily keep people 
unreconciled even when it is fulfilled because justice will never have been completely done, because even when we 
do all that is possible we will not have done enough.  
The church will be able adequately to contribute to peace between people only if we invert the order of priorities 
between liberation and reconciliation, between justice and love. Within a dialectical relationship between the two, 
reconciliation has priority over liberation, and love over justice. It is essential to underscore both the priority of 
reconciliation over liberation and the dialectical relationship between the two. Apart from the priority of 
reconciliation, the pursuit of liberation will never lead to peace and love between former enemies; but without the 
commitment to justice within the overarching framework of love, the pursuit of reconciliation will be perverted into 
a pursuit of cheap reconciliation, a euphemism for perpetuation of domination and oppression. Elsewhere I have 
tried to express this dual relationship by making three suggestions: (1) that the will to embrace and the movement 
toward the other for the sake of reconciliation is prior to any reading of the justice of the other; and (2) that full 
embrace or complete reconciliation can take place only when matters of justice have been attended to. I have also 
argued (3) that matters of justice will be adequately attended to only when justice is not seen in opposition to love, 
but love is understood as ultimately the only adequate form of justice (Volf, 1996).  
This vision of liberation within the overarching framework of reconciliation is expressed in a brilliant way by Peter 
Storey, past president of the Methodist Church of South Africa and of the South African Council of Churches and a 
member of the selection committee for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In a brilliant article entitled, "A 
Different Kind of Justice: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa," he argues that the experiences of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission point  
beyond conventional retribution into a realm where justice and mercy coalesce and both victim and perpetrator must 
know pain if healing is to happen. It is an area more consistent with Calvary than the courtroom. It is the place 
where the guilty discover the pain of forgiveness because the innocent are willing to bear the greater pain of 
forgiving. (Storey, 1997, 793) 
For an exploration on how the struggle for justice can proceed in "an area more consistent with Calvary than the 
courtroom" I can here only point you to my book Exclusion & Embrace.(13) 
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